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1029 
THIRD PARTY CONSENT AND CONTAINER SEARCHES 
IN THE HOME 
Harlan Thomas Mechling
*  
Abstract: Circuit courts disagree as to whether law enforcement officers have a duty to 
inquire about a resident’s actual authority to consent to searches of ambiguous containers in a 
common area. Two circuit courts use the ambiguity approach and two circuit courts use the 
obviousness approach. The ambiguity approach articulated by the D.C. Circuit in United 
States v. Peyton provides protection for individuals’ rights while placing a minimal burden 
on law enforcement officers. In Peyton, the D.C. Circuit held that law enforcement officers 
have a duty to ask clarifying questions if ownership over a container is ambiguous. The 
ambiguity approach advanced by the Peyton court is a well-balanced approach to handling 
third party consent cases. The obviousness approach, which allows officers to search any 
containers that do not obviously belong to someone other than the consenting party, gives too 
much power to police and may infringe on the absent tenant’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy. The ambiguity approach is superior to the obviousness approach, but to properly 
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court should adopt a bright-line rule 
requiring law enforcement officers to inquire before searching any container in a common 
area, regardless of the level of ambiguity. This solution will reduce the administrative costs 
of case-by-case inquiry into the amorphous concept of ambiguity and advance the common 
law tradition of protecting the privacy of individuals in their home. 
INTRODUCTION 
Davon Peyton, a young adult, lives in a one-bedroom apartment with 
his grandmother.
1
 Both Peyton and his grandmother are on the lease—
she lives in the bedroom, and Peyton lives in a corner of the living 
room.
2
 The police suspect Peyton has something illegal in the apartment, 
but they do not have a search warrant or even probable cause to request 
one.
3
 One day, when the police know that Peyton is not home, officers 
knock on the door and ask Peyton’s grandmother if they can search the 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Washington School of Law. Many thanks to Professor 
Mary Fan for her guidance and effort in editing this comment. I would also like to thank the 
Washington Law Review for its countless hours of work on this Comment. 
1. See United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In the district court, Peyton 
referred to his grandmother as “grandmother” and “great-grandmother.” In the Circuit Court, Peyton 
used the term “great-great-grandmother.” See id. at 558 n.1 (Henderson, K., dissenting).  
2. Id. at 549. 
3. Id. 
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apartment.
4
 She consents to a search but warns the police that Peyton 
keeps his private possessions near the bed in the living room.
5
 The 
police ignore the warning and proceed to search Peyton’s space and 
personal belongings.
6
 
Like Peyton and his grandmother, millions of American adults share a 
living space with intermingled possessions, making it critically 
important that American residents have clear rules governing the 
searches of shared living spaces and containers therein.
7
 These searches 
implicate a judicially created rule known as the “apparent authority 
doctrine,” which permits law enforcement officers to rely on the consent 
of a person they reasonably believe has authority over the premises.
8
 
However, the circuit courts have developed different approaches to 
applying the apparent authority doctrine to searches of containers in a 
home. Thus, the outcome of Peyton’s case may differ depending on 
which court hears the case. 
Fortunately for Peyton, his case was heard by the D.C. Circuit in 
United States v. Peyton.
9
 Applying the ambiguity approach, the court 
held that the police officers’ conduct violated the apparent authority 
doctrine. The court explained that Peyton’s grandmother’s warning 
created sufficient ambiguity to make it unreasonable for the police to 
assume her consent extended to Peyton’s personal belongings.10 In 
contrast, the Second and Seventh Circuits apply the obviousness 
approach.
11
 Under this standard, the search would have been proper 
because the area searched did not have clear signs of Peyton’s 
ownership, such as a label, that would require the police to conclude that 
it obviously did not belong to the grandmother.
12
 
                                                     
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 549–50. 
7. Camille Salama, More American Households Doubling Up as Rents Rise, ZILLOW (Oct. 10, 
2014), http://www.zillow.com/blog/doubling-up-161820/ [https://perma.cc/UG4R-3U4K]. 
8. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (creating the apparent authority third party-
consent exception). 
9. 745 F.3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
10. See id. at 553–54 (noting that Hicks’s statement made it unreasonable for the police to believe 
that Hicks shared use of the closed shoebox). 
11. See United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying the obviousness 
approach); United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000) (same). 
12. See Snype, 441 F.3d at 136 (“No officer ever saw Snype carrying the knapsack or red plastic 
bag. No marks on the bags linked them to him.”); Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42 (“there were no 
exterior markings on the purse that should have alerted them to the fact that it belonged to another 
person.”). 
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The ambiguity approach articulated by the D.C. Circuit is the only 
approach currently used in the circuit courts that complies with Supreme 
Court precedent and widely shared social expectations. However, the 
case-by-case analysis is both administratively cumbersome and difficult 
to predict.
13
 This Comment advocates a new approach that goes further 
in protecting individual privacy. 
To properly safeguard individuals’ constitutional right to privacy in 
their home, law enforcement officers should have an affirmative duty to 
clarify the scope of the consenting party’s authority by asking if they 
have actual authority over each container in a common area.
14
 Under this 
approach, if police receive consent to search a living room and then find 
a backpack, they would have an affirmative duty to ask the consenting 
party, “Does this backpack belong to you?”15 Anything short of this 
bright-line clarification would render the search unreasonable and 
outside the protection of the apparent authority doctrine. 
This Comment presents this argument in five main parts. Part I of this 
Comment examines the history of the third party consent doctrine 
through an analysis of landmark Supreme Court cases. Part II explores 
the Supreme Court’s tradition of protecting individuals’ privacy rights in 
their homes and examines modern trends in cohabitation. Part III 
considers the conflicting circuit court decisions that arose in the wake of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Matlock16 and its 
progeny. Part IV demonstrates that the two approaches currently used by 
circuit courts fail to adequately protect individuals’ privacy expectations 
in the home. Part V argues that the Supreme Court should abandon the 
standard-based approach and adopt a bright-line rule for third party 
consent searches of closed containers. 
I. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT PERMITS SEARCHES 
BASED ON THIRD PARTY CONSENT 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects 
citizens from “unreasonable searches” and provides that “no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause.”17 “An essential purpose of a 
warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens 
                                                     
13. See infra Part IV. 
14. See infra Part V. 
15. Cf. Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54 (involving similar facts, albeit with a shoebox instead of a 
backpack).  
16. 415 U.S. 164, 169–72 (1974). 
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
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subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or 
arbitrary acts of government agents.”18 However, the warrant 
requirement is not an absolute prerequisite to reasonableness in 
conducting a search.
19
 The warrant requirement is subject to several 
judicially created exceptions.
20
 
Perhaps the most frequently used exception to the warrant 
requirement is voluntary consent.
21
 A consent search takes place after an 
individual voluntarily agrees to let the government conduct a search. 
These searches are a critical tool used by police when investigating 
criminal activity.
22
 A specific sub-set of this exception, third party 
consent, has continued to evolve over the last four decades.
23
 The term 
“third party consent” refers to situations where one person consents to 
the search of an area over which he or she shares common authority with 
another tenant.
24
 The Supreme Court has evaluated the issue in a variety 
of ways in an attempt to create a uniform constitutional standard 
balancing the needs of law enforcement with the individual privacy 
rights.
25
 Four prominent Supreme Court cases, United States v. Matlock, 
                                                     
18. Skinner v. Ry Labor Execs, 489 U.S. 602, 621–22 (1989); see also United States v. Jeffers, 
342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (“The Fourth Amendment prohibits both unreasonable searches and 
unreasonable seizures, and its protection extends to both ‘houses’ and ‘effects.’”). 
19. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (noting that “searches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions”). 
20. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (noting that “The Fourth Amendment 
demonstrates a ‘strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant’”) (quoting Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958) (“The 
exceptions to the rule that a search must rest upon a search warrant have been jealously and 
carefully drawn . . . .”). 
21. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (noting that it is “well settled that one 
of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause 
is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent”). 
22. See Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 214 (2001–
02) (noting that “[a]lthough precise figures detailing the number of searches conducted pursuant to 
consent are not—and probably can never be—available, there is no dispute that these type of 
searches affect tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of people every year.”). 
23. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.10(d) (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter 
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]; WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 8.3(a)-(e) (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE]. 
24. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169–72 (1974) (recognizing the common 
authority doctrine). 
25. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (creating the third party consent exception 
to the apparent authority doctrine); Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169–72 (recognizing the common authority 
doctrine); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (applying the assumption-of-risk test in cases 
of shared personal property). 
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Illinois v. Rodriguez,
26
 Georgia v. Randolph,
27
 and Fernandez v. 
California,
28
 demonstrate the nuances of the judicially created apparent 
authority doctrine. Matlock and Rodriguez establish the basic rule of the 
third party consent doctrine, while Randolph and Fernandez address 
fact-specific exceptions to the basic rule.
29
 
A. The Supreme Court Adopted the Apparent Authority Doctrine to 
Resolve Cases Involving Third Party Consent 
In United States v. Matlock, the Supreme Court ruled that someone 
with common authority over an area may consent to a government 
search of that area.
30
 The defendant’s living situation in Matlock is 
illustrative of the complexities of modern living arrangements.
31
 The 
defendant, William Earl Matlock, leased a home and shared the premises 
with one of the owners and several of the owner’s children, including 
her daughter, Gayle Graff.
32
 The police suspected Matlock of robbing a 
federally insured bank.
33
 After taking the defendant into custody on his 
front lawn, the officers detained him in a police car waiting on a nearby 
street.
34
 Although the officers were aware at the time of the arrest that 
the defendant lived in the home, they made no attempt to procure his 
consent to a search.
35
 The arresting officers chose to remove the 
defendant from the area and request consent to search the home from 
Graff, who was watching from the front door.
36
 Graff agreed to a search 
of the house, and officers discovered incriminating evidence in a 
common area.
37
 
On a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court upheld the search.
38
 The 
Court clarified that to justify a warrantless search on the basis of 
voluntary consent, the state is not required to demonstrate that consent 
                                                     
26. 497 U.S. 177 (1990). 
27. 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
28. 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014). 
29. Id. at 1134–36; Randolph, 547 U.S. at 115–20; Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186; Matlock, 415 U.S. 
at 169–72. 
30. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169–72. 
31. Id. at 166–68. 
32. Id. 
33. Id.  
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 177. 
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was given specifically by the defendant, only that permission to search 
has been obtained from a third party who possessed common authority 
over the premises—like Graff.39 Additionally, the Court determined that 
under living arrangements in which two or more individuals share a 
home, it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-tenants have the 
right to consent to a search and that the other co-tenants have “assumed 
the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be 
searched.”40 Therefore, by sharing a home with Graff, Matlock had 
assumed the risk that Graff might exercise her right to allow the police 
to search the premises.
41
 
Sixteen years later, the Court substantially expanded third party 
consent power to include the consent of any third party who officers 
reasonably believe possesses common authority over the premises.
42
 In 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, a woman claiming to be the victim of an assault at 
the hands of her ex-boyfriend contacted police to report the 
incident.
43
 The woman, Fischer, told the police that the defendant, 
Rodriguez, was asleep inside the apartment where she and Rodriguez 
lived together, and that she would be willing to let them inside to arrest 
Rodriguez.
44
 In reality, Fischer no longer lived in the apartment—a fact 
not known to the officers.
45
 Upon arrival, Fischer granted the officers 
entrance to the apartment where they discovered Rodriguez sleeping, as 
well as evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia.
46
 In examining the 
effect of Fischer’s apparent authority to give consent, the Court reasoned 
that the Fourth Amendment does not require law enforcement 
conducting a search under an exception to the warrant requirement to 
always be correct in their assessment of the situation, but only to act 
reasonably given the circumstances.
47
 The Court remanded the case to 
the appellate court to determine whether law enforcement reasonably 
believed that Fischer possessed the necessary authority to grant the 
search.
48
 
                                                     
39. Id. at 169–72. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990). 
43. Id. at 179–80. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id.  
47. Id. at 186. 
48. Id. at 189. 
16 - Mechling.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/2017  4:10 PM 
2017] THIRD PARTY CONSENT 1035 
 
B. The Supreme Court Addressed Fact-Specific Exceptions in the 
Years Following Rodriguez 
In 2006, the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Randolph crafted a new, 
fact-specific exception to its landmark holding in United States v. 
Matlock.
49
 The Court held that a present co-tenant’s objection to a search 
of his home is controlling, even if the other co-tenant is present and 
consents to the search.
50
 In other words, Matlock established that a 
present roommate can consent to a search of a house, but Randolph says 
that same consent can be blocked by different co-tenants if they are 
present and assert their Fourth Amendment rights.
51
 
Eight years after Randolph, the Supreme Court decided Fernandez v. 
California, reaffirming its decision in Rodriguez that absent residents 
cannot object to a search—even if the absence is caused by law 
enforcement removal.
52
 In Fernandez, officers knocked on the door of a 
residence from which they heard screams.
53
 A woman opened the door 
and told the officers that she was alone with her son and that no one else 
was present.
54
 When the officers asked her if she would step outside so 
that they could conduct a protective sweep of the apartment, Fernandez 
appeared in the doorway and objected to the sweep.
55
 The officers 
suspected domestic violence and immediately removed Fernandez from 
the residence and placed him under arrest.
56
 
One hour after the initial arrest, officers returned to the apartment, 
informed the woman that they had arrested Fernandez, and again asked 
for permission to search the premises.
57
 The woman consented to the 
search.
58
 In the apartment, police found gang paraphernalia, weapons, 
and ammunition.
59
 The Supreme Court held that the search was lawful 
because Fernandez was removed from the premises for lawful 
purposes.
60
 
                                                     
49. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).  
50. Id. 
51. See id.  
52. Fernandez v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1134–36 (2014). 
53. Id. at 1130–31. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 1130–31; People v. Fernandez, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), 
aff’d, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014). 
60. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130. 
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Matlock and its progeny provide the legal rules governing third party 
consent cases. The government may rebut the presumption that a 
warrantless search is unreasonable by showing that someone with 
authority permitted the law enforcement officers to conduct the 
search.
61
 Such consent need not come from the target of the search; it 
may come from “a third party who possesse[s] common authority 
over . . . the premises or effects sought to be inspected.”62 “Common 
authority” does not refer to some kind of “technical property 
interest.”63 It arises simply from 
mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint 
access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to 
recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit 
the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed 
the risk that one of their number might permit the common area 
to be searched.
64
 
Even people who do not actually use the property can authorize a 
search if it is reasonable for law enforcement officers to believe they 
have authority over the property.
65
 Such “apparent authority” is 
sufficient to sustain a search because the Fourth Amendment requires 
“not that [officers’ factual determinations] always be correct, but that 
they always be reasonable.”66 To object to a search, a person must be 
physically present—this objection will overcome the consent of any 
other resident.
67
 Law enforcement officers may remove the objecting 
party if they have a lawful reason to do so, and his objection will no 
longer be effective.
68
 
The Supreme Court precedent discussed above informs the discussion 
of co-tenant consent searches. However, the precedent does not directly 
address the present issue of whether one housemate may consent to a 
search of all containers in a common area. The answer to that question 
requires courts to decide whether an officer can sustain a reasonable 
                                                     
61. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). 
62. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). 
63. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 110 (2006). 
64. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7. 
65. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186. 
66. Id. at 185; see also id. at 186 (“Whether the basis for such authority exists is the sort of 
recurring factual question to which law enforcement officials must be expected to apply their 
judgment; and all the Fourth Amendment requires is that they answer it reasonably.”). 
67. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 115–20. 
68. Fernandez v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1134–36 (2014).  
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belief that the consenting party has authority over an item in light of 
facts that make ownership of the item ambiguous.
69
 
II. WHEN DECIDING FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES, THE 
SUPREME COURT PLACES A HIGH VALUE ON PRIVACY 
IN THE HOME AND OFTEN CONSIDERS SOCIAL 
EXPECTATIONS IN ITS ANALYSIS 
“At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a 
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion.”70 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
individuals are given the most protection from government intrusion 
when they are in their homes.
71
 The Court often supports its reasoning 
by reference to historical customs and widely shared social 
expectations.
72
 The number of people in the United States living with 
roommates has risen dramatically over the last forty years, and the social 
expectations surrounding roommate relationships have changed with it.
73
 
Thus, the Supreme Court would be warranted in revisiting precedent and 
adopting a new rule to govern third party consent cases over closed 
containers. 
                                                     
69. United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
70. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).  
71. Baith v. State, 598 A.2d 762, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 296–97 (1984) (“We frequently have noted 
that privacy interests are especially strong in a private residence.”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 585–86 (1980) (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the 
Fourth Amendment is directed.” (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 
(1972))). 
72. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–18 (2013) (“[T]he 
background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite him there to conduct a 
search . . . .”); Randolph, 547 U.S. at 114 (“Since the co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third 
party has no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present and objecting 
co-tenant, his disputed invitation, without more, gives a police officer no better claim to 
reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in the absence of any consent at all.”) 
(emphasis added); id. at 120 (“But nothing in social custom or its reflection in private law argues for 
placing a higher value on delving into private premises to search for evidence in the face of disputed 
consent, than on requiring clear justification before the government searches private living quarters 
over a resident’s objection.”). 
73. See infra section II.C.  
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A. The Supreme Court Has Traditionally Maximized Personal Privacy 
by Providing Individuals the Highest Possible Levels of Protection 
in their Homes 
In the common law tradition, a man’s home is his castle.74 The castle 
metaphor refers to the home as the “exemplary site of personal liberty 
from state intrusion and control. The state’s authority stops at the 
threshold.”75 This principle is essential to third party consent searches 
because it suggests that the Court is reluctant to allow third parties to 
erode individuals’ right to privacy in their homes. The Supreme Court 
has followed the common law tradition by extending heightened 
protections to the home under the Fourth Amendment
76
: “when it comes 
to the [F]ourth [A]mendment, the home is first among equals.”77 
Given the Court’s home privacy concerns, it has carved out special 
rules that apply in the context of home searches by law enforcement 
officers.
78
 For example, the police cannot take a drug-sniffing dog onto 
the porch of an individual’s home, even though pedestrians are 
traditionally allowed to walk up to someone’s door and knock.79 In 
Florida v. Jardines,
80
 the police suspected that Jardines was growing 
marijuana inside his home.
81
 An officer and a drug-sniffing dog 
approached Jardines’s front door with the intent to discover evidence 
that could support a finding of probable cause for a warrant.
82
 The dog 
sniffed around the door and signaled to the officer that narcotics were 
present inside the home.
83
 The Court held that this constituted an illegal 
                                                     
74. JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS 
CHANGING PRIVACY 2–5 (2009); see also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 115 (“We have, after all, lived our 
whole national history with an understanding of ‘the ancient adage that a man’s home is his 
castle.’”) (citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958)). 
75. SUK, supra note 74, at 5.  
76. Baith, 598 A.2d at 764; see also Clifford, 464 U.S. at 296–97 (“We frequently have noted that 
privacy interests are especially strong in a private residence.”); Payton, 445 U.S. at 585–
86 (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed.” (quoting United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972))). 
77. Jardines, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013). 
78. See id. at 1415–18 (2013); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35–40 (2001); Clifford, 464 
U.S. at 296–97 (“We frequently have noted that privacy interests are especially strong in a private 
residence.”); Payton, 445 U.S. at 585–86 (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against 
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” (quoting U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. at 313)); 
Baith, 598 A.2d at 764. 
79. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415–18. 
80. Id.  
81. Id. at 1413. 
82. See id. 
83. Id.  
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search because the officer was trespassing on Jardines’s property when 
the search took place.
84
 The Court recognized that some visitors, like 
Girl Scouts, have an implied license to approach the front door to knock 
but held that an officer with a drug-sniffing dog does not have such a 
license, and therefore trespasses if he approaches one’s door with a drug 
dog.
85
 It grounded this conclusion in social custom, saying that “the 
background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not 
invite him there to conduct a search.”86 
Similarly, the Court has held that using sense-enhancing technology 
to observe the inside of a home is unlawful, even if law enforcement 
officers are using this technology from a lawful vantage point.
87
 In Kyllo 
v. United States,
88
 the Court considered the propriety of police use of 
thermal-imaging technology to detect a marijuana grow operation. 
Officers suspected Kyllo of growing marijuana inside his home and used 
a thermal-imaging device—not available to the public—to determine 
whether Kyllo was using high-powered indoor lights to simulate 
artificial sunlight.
89
 Using this device, they discovered an unusual 
amount of heat emanating from the garage.
90
 The police used this 
evidence to obtain a search warrant which led to the discovery of 100 
marijuana plants inside the home.
91
 The Supreme Court ruled that even 
the thermal imaging of Kyllo’s home from a lawful vantage point 
constituted a warrantless search, holding that a person has a heightened 
expectation of privacy within his home.
92
 
As Jardines and Kyllo illustrate, the Supreme Court has voiced strong 
concerns over warrantless government searches that occur inside or even 
near the home.
93
 In the context of third party consent searches, the 
government typically conducts a warrantless search within the home.
94
 It 
follows that the Supreme Court would be highly skeptical of any third 
party consent searches by the government that do not strictly adhere to 
                                                     
84. Id. at 1415–18. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
88. Id.  
89. Id. at 29–31. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 40. 
93. Id.; Florida v. Jardines, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–18 (2013).  
94. See, e.g., United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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the rule it advanced in Rodriguez—that officers can rely on third party 
consent only when they reasonably believe that the consenting party has 
authority over the premises.
95
 This reasonableness inquiry should be 
informed by Supreme Court precedent establishing that the Fourth 
Amendment applies most strictly in the home.
96
 Thus, when officers face 
ambiguity, the third party consent analysis should be weighted in favor 
of protecting individual rights.
97
 
B. The Supreme Court Has Traditionally Considered Social Customs 
and Expectations in its Analysis of Fourth Amendment Cases 
In seminal Fourth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has placed a 
high value on social customs.
98
 For example, in Georgia v. Randolph, 
the Supreme Court based the primary legal rationale for its decision on a 
concept it referred to as “widely shared social expectations.”99 The Court 
reasoned that law enforcement cannot enter a residence if a present co-
tenant objects to a search because no “social practice” supports allowing 
one co-tenant to get her way over another objecting co-
tenant.
100
 Applying this restrictive standard, the Court invalidated the 
search of the Randolph home and carved a limited exception to the 
common authority rule that it deemed more aligned with the 
particularities of social norms.
101
 
The origin of the social expectations concept within Fourth 
Amendment law traces back to Katz v. United States.
102
 Under the Katz 
                                                     
95. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415–18; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.  
96. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (“[W]hen it comes to the [F]ourth [A]mendment, the home is 
first among equals.”). 
97. See Michael C. Weiber, Theory and Practice of Illinois v. Rodriguez: Why an Officer’s 
Reasonable Belief About a Third Party’s Authority to Consent Does Not Protect a Criminal 
Suspect’s Rights, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604, 634 (1993) (“Thus, in balancing the interests 
of the government and the individual, [Justice Marshall] concluded that the weight clearly falls on 
the side of protecting defendant’s rights.”). 
98. See, e.g., Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415–18; Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115–20 
(2006). 
99. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415–18; Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111. 
100. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 114. 
101. Id. at 115–20. 
102. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Court held that the government’s activities in 
electronically listening to and recording defendant’s words spoken into telephone receiver in public 
telephone booth violated the defendant’s privacy and thus constituted a “search and seizure” within 
the Fourth Amendment. Id. Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion set forth a twofold test for 
determining whether an expectation of privacy exists: first, a person must have a subjective 
expectation of privacy, and second, that expectation must be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as “reasonable.” Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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ruling, to make a valid claim of protection under the Fourth Amendment, 
a criminal defendant must demonstrate that he or she had a personal 
expectation of privacy in the place where the search occurred, and that 
this expectation is “one society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”103 The Court in Rakas v. Illinois104 explained that in order 
to legitimize an expectation of privacy under Katz, it must refer to a 
“source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to 
concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are 
recognized and permitted by society.”105 In Rakas, the Court used social 
custom to analyze the rights of the occupants of a motor vehicle, none of 
whom possessed any property or possessory interest in the vehicle or the 
evidence seized within.
106
 The Court held that because the defendants 
failed to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched 
automobile, they therefore lacked a capacity to claim the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment.
107
 
The next notable application of the social expectations analysis arose 
in the context of standing in Minnesota v. Olsen.
108
 In Olsen, the Court 
explicitly held that an overnight guest in a friend’s home had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy there, and thus possessed the requisite 
legal standing to assert a violation of his Fourth Amendment 
protections.
109
 By simply recognizing the “everyday expectations of 
privacy that we all share” the Court firmly established that an overnight 
houseguest shares not only in his host’s home, but also in his expectation 
                                                     
103. Id. 
104. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
105. Id. at 144 n.12. 
106. Id. at 129–50. 
107. Id. at 148. In describing the defendant’s constitutional standing, the Court stated that: 
They asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile, nor an interest in 
the property seized. And as we have previously indicated, the fact that they were “legitimately 
on [the] premises” in the sense that they were in the car with the permission of its owner is not 
determinative of whether they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas of 
the automobile searched.  
Id. 
108. 495 U.S. 91 (1990). 
109. Id. at 99 (“From the overnight guest’s perspective, he seeks shelter in another’s home 
precisely because it provides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not be 
disturbed by anyone but his host and those his host allows inside. We are at our most vulnerable 
when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our own safety or the security of our belongings. It 
is for this reason that, although we may spend all day in public places, when we cannot sleep in our 
own home we seek out another private place to sleep, whether it be a hotel room or the home of a 
friend. Society expects at least as much privacy in these places as in a telephone booth, ‘a 
temporarily private place whose momentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are 
recognized as reasonable.’”). 
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of privacy therein.
110
 These cases illustrate that in the Fourth 
Amendment context, the Court will look to social expectations to inform 
its analysis. In resolving the circuit split on third party consent, the Court 
should once again look to social expectations, recognizing that 
roommate relationships, and the social expectations that surround these 
relationships, have changed over the last several decades.
111
 
C. Since the Supreme Court’s Decision in Matlock, the Number of 
Americans Living with Roommates Has Risen Sharply 
The number of young adults living with a roommate has increased 
while married household arrangements wane.
112
 The share of young 
adults living with a roommate rose from 6% in 1968 to 27% in 2012.
113
 
Meanwhile, the share of young adults who are married and living in their 
own homes plummeted from 56% in 1968 to 23% in 2012.
114
 
This dramatic rise in the share of adults living with roommates may 
be related to a variety of factors.
115
 For example, the number of adults 
cohabiting outside of marriage has increased significantly.
116
 A study 
conducted by the University of Minnesota suggests that from the year 
                                                     
110. Id. at 98–99 (“That the guest has a host who has ultimate control of the house is not 
inconsistent with the guest having a legitimate expectation of privacy. The houseguest is there with 
the permission of his host, who is willing to share his house and his privacy with his guest.”). 
111. See infra section II.C.  
112. See Richard Fry, For the First Time in Modern Era, Living With Parents Edges Out Other 
Living Arrangements for 18- to 34-Year-Olds, PEW RES. CTR. (May 24, 2016), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/05/24/for-first-time-in-modern-era-living-with-parents-edges-
out-other-living-arrangements-for-18-to-34-year-olds/ [https://perma.cc/Q7CF-8M7B] [hereinafter 
Fry, Living With Parents]. Those trends correlate with an increase in rent prices: today, Americans 
making the median national income should expect to pay almost a third of their income on rent, 
marking an all-time high. Salama, supra note 7. Many states follow the rule that all assets acquired 
during marriage are considered “community property.” U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Basic 
Principles of Community Property Law, IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-018-
001.html [https://perma.cc/Z5E3-NP5K]. As a result, this Comment, and the studies cited within, 
treat married spouses different than roommates. Furthermore, the concerns surrounding privacy 
rights being inadvertently eroded by a third party are generally less prevalent when the two people 
in question are involved in an intimate personal relationship such as a marriage. See United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 166–67 (1974) (finding that the consenting party had no actual authority and 
tried to have the actual resident arrested).  
113. See Fry, Living with Parents, supra note 112. 
114. See id. Note that the Pew Research Center tabulations do not consider married couples to be 
roommates for the purposes of this study. See id. fig.3. Thus, any reference to roommates in this 
Comment refers to unmarried, cohabiting adults.  
115. Wendy Wang & Kim Parker, Record Share of Americans Have Never Married, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/09/24/record-share-of-americans-have-
never-married/[https://perma.cc/44EL-NRME]. 
116. Id. 
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1960 to 2000, the percentage of unmarried couples living together has 
increased by more than tenfold.
117
 Another factor contributing to the 
overall rise in cohabitation is the trend of adults living with parents.
118
 In 
2014, for the first time in more than 130 years, adults ages eighteen to 
thirty-four were slightly more likely to be living in their parents’ homes 
than they were to be living with a spouse or partner in their own 
household.
119
 
A 2005 study of adult living arrangements found that Black and 
Hispanic persons are the most likely to live at home with parents.
120
 
Record-high shares of young Black and Hispanic adults lived in the 
home of a parent in 2014: 36% for each group.
121
 For young Black 
adults, living with a parent is now the most common arrangement, as 
only 17% were living with a spouse or romantic partner in 2014.
122 
For 
young Hispanic adults, living with a parent is also the dominant 
arrangement, as 30% were living with a spouse or significant other in 
2014.
123
 By comparison, 30% of young white adults lived at home with a 
parent.
 
The high rate of cohabitation in the Black and Hispanic 
communities suggests that third party consent cases will affect 
individuals from these communities at a disproportionately higher rate. 
Thus, the problems with the third party consent law addressed later in 
this Comment may affect minority populations more than white 
populations. 
The growth of public housing in the late twentieth century has also 
contributed to the prevalence of shared living arrangements. There are 
approximately 1.2 million households living in public housing units in 
America, managed by some 3300 housing agencies.
124
 Experts speculate 
that there is a large population of people living in public housing units 
that go unreported.
125
 These so-called “ghost tenants” are tenants who 
                                                     
117. Catherine Fitch et al., The Rise of Cohabitation in the United States: New Historical 
Estimates, MINN. POPULATION CTR. U. OF MINN. (March 2005), http://users.hist.umn.edu/~ruggles/ 
cohab-revised2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZE62-Y7FJ] (figs.1 & 2). 
118. Fry, Living With Parents, supra note 112. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD’s Public Housing Program, HUD.GOV, 
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/rental_assistance/phprog [https://perma.cc/G6E7-
WLBZ]. 
125. Joe Anuta, How Many People Live in the City's Public Housing? The Answer Is in the 
Trash, CRAIN’S (October 29, 2015), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20151029/REAL_ 
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are off the records, sometimes sleeping in living rooms or other cramped 
spaces with other tenants.
126
 In New York City, which is home to the 
largest public housing authority in North America,
127
 “ghost tenancy” is 
especially problematic. 400,000 people officially live in New York 
City’s traditional public housing units, but the New York City Housing 
Authority estimates that an additional 100,000 or more reside there 
secretly.
128
 Thus, the population living in New York City’s publicly 
owned housing could be twenty-five percent higher than the official 
count provides.
129
 
The rising ghost tenant problem, and the greater cohabitation 
phenomenon it illustrates, complicates application of the third party 
consent doctrine and raises significant questions about whether courts 
should rely on third party consent without requiring police to inquire 
further. Given the ghost tenant problem, courts should consider whether 
it is reasonable for law enforcement to assume that individuals 
answering the door have authority to consent to searches. Courts should 
also consider whether the analysis changes if a legal tenant answers the 
door and law enforcement officials seek to search space that is obviously 
inhabited by someone other than the consenting party. 
Given the rise in shared living spaces and ghost tenants, it is critically 
important that United States residents have clear rules governing third 
party consent to searches of shared living spaces.
130
 The current legal 
framework, particularly in the Second and Seventh Circuits, requires law 
enforcement to inquire about the scope of the consenting party’s 
authority only in special situations.
131
 This means that law enforcement 
officers sometimes do not know if the items they searched actually 
                                                     
ESTATE/151029852/how-many-people-live-in-the-citys-public-housing-the-answer-is-in-the-trash 
[https://perma.cc/BLW8-2LWF] (“The waste-collection data suggest the Housing Authority's actual 
ranks are at least 100,000 larger than the official number.”). 
126. Jake Blumgart, The Ghost Tenants of New York City, SLATE (Mar. 3, 2016), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/metropolis/2016/03/new_york_city_public_housing_could_h
ave_more_than_100_000_ghost_tenants.html [https://perma.cc/KZZ2-FXQT]. Given the confined 
scope of this Comment, it does not attempt to resolve the “Ghost Tenant” issue. Rather, the issue is 
raised here to show the complexity of the third party consent issue given modern living 
arrangements. 
127. Facts About NYCHA, N.Y. CITY HOUS. AUTH. (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www1.nyc.gov/ 
assets/nycha/downloads/pdf/factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/KK56-J9LX]. 
128. Blumgart, supra note 126.  
129. See id.  
130. See id. 
131. See United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Melgar, 
227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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belong to the consenting party or an absent roommate.
132
 Thus, 
individuals who live with roommates are at a greater risk of having their 
belongings searched by police without their consent. 
III. CIRCUIT COURTS ARE SPLIT REGARDING THE DUTY OF 
LAW ENFORCEMENT TO CLARIFY AUTHORITY OVER 
CONTAINERS IN A SHARED SPACE 
The apparent authority doctrine permits searches based on third party 
consent where the officers conducting the search “reasonably believe” 
that the person who has consented to the search has authority over the 
premises.
133
 But when police encounter closed containers in a common 
area, the apparent authority doctrine becomes difficult to apply.
134
 
Because millions of Americans live with roommates, and therefore share 
authority over common areas,
 
it is essential that Americans have clear 
rules governing consent searches of closed containers in those areas.
135
 
Circuit courts disagree as to whether law enforcement has an 
affirmative duty to ask the consenting party if he or she has actual 
authority over an ambiguous item in a common area.
136
 The Second and 
Seventh Circuits require law enforcement to ask about ownership of a 
container in a common area only if the container obviously does not 
belong to the consenting party.
137
 The Sixth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit 
require law enforcement to ask about ownership of a container if 
ownership is at least ambiguous.
138
 This Comment seeks to resolve the 
legal conflict by requiring law enforcement to ask before searching any 
container in a common area. Such an approach places the informational 
burden on the party best situated to bear it—the government.139 
                                                     
132. See United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
133. Illinois v Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 189 (1990). 
134. Compare Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54, and United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 681–82 
(6th Cir. 2010), with Snype, 441 F.3d at 119, and Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42. 
135. Salama, supra note 7.  
136. Cf. Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54; Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42. 
137. Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42 (holding that obvious ownership is indicated by exterior 
markings that should alert officers that it is owned by another person); Snype, 441 F.3d 119 (same).  
138. See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54; Taylor, 600 F.3d at 681–82. 
139. See infra Part IV. The police are best situated to bear the burden of asking clarifying 
questions because they have a responsibility to protect citizens, a responsibility that should include 
protecting citizens from having their privacy rights eroded by others. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE CMTY. RELATIONS SERV., PRINCIPLES OF GOOD POLICING: AVOIDING VIOLENCE BETWEEN 
POLICE AND CITIZENS (2003), https://www.justice.gov/archive/crs/pubs/principlesofgoodpolicing 
final092003.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B4F-8T6N] [hereinafter DOJ PRINCIPLES OF GOOD POLICING] 
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A. The Second and Seventh Circuits Have Adopted the Obviousness 
Approach, Which Allows Officers to Rely on Third Party Consent 
Even When Ownership of the Item Is Ambiguous and Uncertain 
The cases discussed in this section demonstrate the obviousness 
approach: law enforcement officers have an affirmative duty to clarify 
ownership of a container only if the container obviously belongs to 
someone other than the consenting party.
140
 The Second and Seventh 
Circuits have adopted the obviousness standard, meaning officers do not 
need to clarify ownership of ambiguous items in a common area.
141
 
According to the Second Circuit, a female resident’s open-ended 
consent can extend to her male overnight guest’s room and 
belongings.
142
 In United States v. Snype,
143
 FBI officers obtained an 
arrest warrant for Vernon Snype
144
 and forcibly entered Jennifer Bean’s 
apartment to arrest him.
145
 On the floor of the bedroom where Snype was 
arrested, officers found a knapsack that contained evidence linking him 
to a robbery.
146
 After removing Snype from the apartment, officers 
sought Bean’s consent to search her residence, which she voluntarily 
gave.
147
 At a suppression hearing, she explained that she had never met 
Snype before her boyfriend asked if he could spend the night at her 
apartment.
148
 
Despite the fact that Snype was an overnight guest, his motion to 
suppress was denied.
149
 On appeal, the Second Circuit considered 
whether Bean’s consent was sufficient for police to search the containers 
in the residence.
150
 The court first noted that “her open-ended consent 
would permit the search and seizure of any items found in the apartment 
with the exception of those ‘obviously’ belonging to another person.”151 
Thus, Snype could not merely assert that there was no reasonable basis 
                                                     
(“[T]he police, by virtue of the authority that society vests in them, have overarching responsibility 
for the outcome of encounters with citizens.”).  
140. Snype, 441 F.3d at 126–27. 
141. See id. at 136–37; Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42. 
142. Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 136.  
150. Id. at 136–37. 
151. Id. at 136. 
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for searching the containers; he bore the burden of presenting evidence 
that established the containers “were obviously and exclusively his.”152 
Because the containers were not marked and the room in which they 
were found housed objects “ranging from children’s toys to a laptop 
computer found inside a carrying case,” the court concluded that the 
defendant failed to demonstrate that he obviously and exclusively owned 
the containers.
153
 
According to the Seventh Circuit, a person’s open-ended consent can 
extend to all closed containers in a room, even those hidden underneath 
a mattress.
154
 In United States v. Melgar,
155
 the police arrived at a hotel 
room looking for counterfeit checks and asked several women in the 
room for permission to search their purses.
156
 An officer then asked the 
woman renting the room for her consent to search the room, which she 
voluntarily gave.
157
 The police looked under a mattress and discovered 
an unmarked floral purse that contained a counterfeit check and an 
identification form indicating the defendant—not the consenting 
woman—was the purse’s owner.158 
The Seventh Circuit heard the appeal from the District Court, which 
denied Melgar’s motion to suppress.159 After determining that the 
consenting woman had the apparent authority to consent to the search of 
the hotel room, the Seventh Circuit turned its attention to the question of 
whether she had apparent authority over the purse: 
In a sense, the real question for closed container searches is 
which way the risk of uncertainty should run. Is such a search 
permissible only if the police have positive knowledge that the 
closed container is also under the authority of the person who 
originally consented to the search . . . or is it permissible if the 
police do not have reliable information that the container is not 
under the authorizer’s control.160 
                                                     
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 136–37. 
154. United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000). 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 1039–40. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 1040. 
159. Id. at 1041. 
160. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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Ultimately, the court found that “the police had no reason to know 
that the floral purse they found under the mattress did not belong to [the 
consenting party].”161 
In sum, the Second and Seventh Circuits have extended a co-tenant’s 
open-ended consent to closed containers in a common area, except those 
that obviously do not belong to that co-tenant.
162
 In the absence of an 
officer’s positive knowledge that a container belongs to another, or some 
other clear manifestation of privacy, officers can rely on someone’s 
open-ended consent to search any container in a common area.
163
 
B. The Sixth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit Have Adopted the Ambiguity 
Approach, Which Requires Officers to Inquire About Actual 
Authority When Ownership of an Item Is Ambiguous 
Two circuit courts have adopted the ambiguity approach, holding that 
law enforcement officers are required to clarify ownership of ambiguous 
items in a common area.
164
 By adopting this ambiguity standard, the 
Sixth and the D.C. Circuits have narrowed the scope of a resident’s 
open-ended consent to include only those items and areas that do not 
raise any questions of ownership in the minds of a reasonable officer.
165
 
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that “[t]he government cannot establish that 
its agents reasonably relied upon a third party’s apparent authority if 
agents, faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed without 
making further inquiry.”166 
The Sixth Circuit held that prior false assertions of authority 
generated sufficient ambiguity to trigger the officer’s duty to inquire.167 
In United States v. Purcell,
168
 after the police arrested Frederick Purcell, 
his girlfriend, Yolande Crist, consented to a search of their hotel 
room.
169
 The police observed two duffel bags and a backpack in the 
room, and Crist stated that one contained a firearm.
170
 She also indicated 
                                                     
161. Id. 
162. See id. at 1041–42; United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2006). 
163. See Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42; Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37. 
164. See United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014); United States v. Taylor, 
600 F.3d 678, 681–82, 685 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 963–64 (6th Cir. 
2008). 
165. See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54; Taylor, 600 F.3d at 681–82. 
166. Purcell, 526 F.3d at 963.  
167. Id. at 964–65. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 956–58.  
170. Id. at 957–58. 
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that one of the duffel bags was hers, and upon searching it, an officer 
found marijuana and men’s clothing.171 During his search, the officer 
“realized that Crist had misstated her ownership of the bag, [but] he did 
not ask her to verify whether she owned any of the other bags in the 
room” before continuing to search them.172 
The court acknowledged that Crist had the apparent authority to 
consent to a search of the room, but noted that “apparent authority 
cannot exist if there is ambiguity as to the asserted authority and the 
searching officers do not take steps to resolve the ambiguity.”173 Once 
the officer discovered men’s clothing in the bag claimed by Crist, 
“ambiguity clouded [her] authority to consent to the search of the 
backpack.”174 As such, the police were obligated to obtain additional 
consent to search the other items in the room.
175
 
The Sixth Circuit reached a similar result in a different case, holding 
that a woman’s open-ended consent did not extend to a spare bedroom 
filled with men’s clothes.176 In United States v. Taylor,177 police had an 
outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant, Mark Taylor, but did not 
have a search warrant for the apartment where they believed he was 
staying as a guest.
178
 Officers arrived at the apartment and were met by 
Sabrina Arnett, the tenant, who allowed police to search the apartment 
for Taylor.
179
 After arresting Taylor upstairs, and removing him from the 
premises, officers returned to the second floor, where they had 
previously noticed a spare bedroom with “men’s clothes lying about.”180 
They entered the spare bedroom, searched the closet, and found a men’s 
shoebox containing a handgun and ammunition.
181
 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit first noted the circumstantial ambiguity: 
the closet contained a mix of men’s and children’s clothing, and 
“nothing in the closet indicated that the items within it belonged to 
Arnett or were regularly used by her.”182 The court determined that a 
                                                     
171. Id. at 958. 
172. Id.  
173. Id. at 963. 
174. Id. at 964. 
175. Id. at 965. 
176. United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 681–82, 685 (6th Cir. 2010).  
177. Id.  
178. Id. at 679. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 679–80. 
182. Id. at 681–82. 
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reasonable person would have doubts about the ownership of the 
shoebox and added that the district court had found that “the police 
would likely not have opened the closed shoebox if they believed it 
belonged to Arnett. Rather, they opened the shoebox precisely because 
they believed it likely belonged to Taylor.”183 The court found the police 
officer’s failure to cure the factual ambiguity was fatal to Arnett’s 
apparent authority to consent.
184
 
Similarly, in United States v. Peyton,
185
 the D.C. Circuit held that a 
grandmother’s open-ended consent did not extend to her grandson’s 
personal space.
186
 Peyton and his eighty-five-year-old grandmother, 
Martha Hicks, were residents of a one-bedroom apartment in 
Washington, D.C.
187
 Peyton’s bed and personal property were in the 
living room, and Hicks used the bedroom.
188
 Four officers went to the 
apartment when they knew that Peyton would be gone and asked Hicks 
to consent to a search of the apartment.
189
 As one of the officers 
approached Peyton’s bed, Hicks “told them that that part of the living 
room was ‘the area where [Peyton] keeps his personal property.’”190 One 
of the officers then picked up a shoebox next to Peyton’s bed, opened it, 
and found drugs and other incriminating evidence.
191
 
The D.C. Circuit held the search was unlawful because Hicks did not 
have actual or apparent authority over Peyton’s shoebox.192 According to 
the court, Hicks’s statement about Peyton’s “personal property” should 
have alerted the police that it was unreasonable to believe she had 
authority over Peyton’s belongings.193 Hicks’s statements created 
ambiguity as to the ownership of the shoebox, triggering the officer’s 
duty to inquire.
194
 
In summary, the circuit courts have developed two standards to 
examine officers’ conduct when they encounter ambiguous containers 
during a search based on third party consent. These standards attempt to 
                                                     
183. Id. at 682. 
184. Id. at 679, 685. 
185. 745 F.3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
186. Id. at 549, 553–54. 
187. Id. at 549. 
188. Id. 
189. Id.  
190. Id. (alteration in original). 
191. Id. at 549–50. 
192. Id. at 554–55.  
193. Id. 
194. Id.  
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reconcile the heightened expectations of privacy afforded to closed 
containers with law enforcement’s need to conduct an efficient, thorough 
search of the premises.
195
 On the one hand, courts employing the 
obviousness standard permit a closed-container search when an officer 
lacks positive knowledge that a container does not belong to the 
consenting party.
196
 On the other hand, courts employing the ambiguity 
standard use positive knowledge in another way—when the 
circumstances present any degree of uncertainty or ambiguity, law 
enforcement must obtain positive knowledge that the container in 
question belongs to the consenting party.
197
 
IV. THE AMBIGUITY APPROACH IS SUPERIOR TO THE 
OBVIOUSNESS APPROACH, BUT BOTH APPROACHES 
FAIL TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT INDIVIDUALS’ 
PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS IN THE HOME 
The ambiguity approach provides greater privacy protections than the 
obviousness approach,
198
 but neither approach adequately protects 
individuals from unreasonable government searches of containers in 
their home. The obviousness approach is not consistent with the 
apparent authority doctrine because it does not use the concept of 
reasonableness to constrain the scope of police searches.
199
 The 
ambiguity approach uses reasonableness to constrain the scope of police 
searches, but still leaves open the potential for police to search a 
container that does not actually belong to the consenting tenant.
200
 Thus, 
the ambiguity approach is more consistent with Rodriguez—but neither 
standard adequately protects the rights of individuals to be free from 
unreasonable searches in their home. 
                                                     
195. See id. at 552–54. 
196. See United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Melgar, 
227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000). 
197. See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54; United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 681–82, 685 (6th 
Cir. 2010); United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 963–64 (6th Cir. 2008). 
198. Compare Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54 (protecting an absent tenant’s privacy in his container) 
with Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37 (allowing the police to search an overnight guest’s containers 
without his consent). 
199. See Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37 (holding that the police can search any containers that do not 
obviously belong to someone other than the consenting party).  
200. See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54 (holding that the police can search any container when 
ownership of the container is not ambiguous).  
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A. The Obviousness Approach Is Not Consistent with the Apparent 
Authority Doctrine 
The obviousness approach is not consistent with the apparent 
authority doctrine because it allows law enforcement to search an 
unmarked container even if it is unreasonable for officers to believe the 
consenting party has authority over the container.
201
 For example, 
imagine that the police knock on the door of a two-bedroom apartment 
because they suspect that someone in the apartment is selling drugs. A 
man with a long beard wearing a Donald Trump campaign shirt opens 
the door. The police ask for permission to search the apartment, and the 
man responds, “Go ahead and search the place, my roommate, Anna, is 
at a Women’s Rights march—she left all her stuff here and won’t be 
home for hours.” On a couch in the living room, officers find a pink 
purse on top of a rainbow-colored blanket. 
In light of the man’s statement about his female roommate leaving her 
belongings in the apartment, it seems like a reasonable officer would 
have doubts about whether the bearded man wearing the Trump shirt has 
authority over the pink purse in the living room.
202
 Thus, under the 
apparent authority doctrine—which is grounded in an officer’s 
reasonable belief that the person has authority to consent—the officers 
should be prohibited from searching the purse.
203
 Yet, the fact that it is 
unreasonable does not prevent police from searching the purse if the 
jurisdiction has adopted the obviousness standard.
204
 Under the 
obviousness approach, when given open-ended consent to search a 
common area, law enforcement officers can search anything that does 
not have clear exterior markings indicating obvious and exclusive 
                                                     
201. But cf. Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37 (holding that the open-ended consent of a female resident 
extends to the search of a knapsack and red plastic bag found in the spare bedroom where a male 
house guest was arrested); Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42 (holding that the open-ended consent of a 
female occupant extends to a purse found under a mattress in a hotel room used by multiple women, 
one of whom had two purses).  
202. The Washington Law Review and the author of this Comment do not support making broad 
generalizations about groups of people based on their appearance or political beliefs. This 
hypothetical references political and gender-based stereotypes to illustrate a very delicate point 
about ambiguity and uncertainty in the mind of a reasonable officer during a search. 
203. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990) (establishing the apparent authority 
doctrine and suggesting that “[e]ven when [an] invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion 
that the person lives there, the surrounding circumstances could conceivably be such that a 
reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act upon it without further inquiry”). 
204. See Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37; Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42. 
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ownership by another party.
205
 Because the purse here does not have 
exterior markings linking it to another person, law enforcement officers 
in obviousness jurisdictions can search the purse without asking 
clarifying questions.
206
 
The obviousness approach, by allowing officers to search a container 
even when a reasonable officer would not believe that the consenting 
party has authority over the container, stretches the apparent authority 
doctrine beyond its constitutional limits.
207
 
1. Case Law Demonstrates that the Obviousness Approach Is 
Inconsistent with the Apparent Authority Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has urged officers to be skeptical when relying on 
third party consent.
208
 As the Rodriguez Court put it: 
Even when the invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion 
that the person lives there, the surrounding circumstances could 
conceivably be such that a reasonable person would doubt its 
truth and not act upon it without further inquiry. As with other 
factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, 
determination of consent to enter must “be judged against an 
objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the 
moment . . . ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’” 
that the consenting party had authority over the premises?
209
  
The Second and Seventh Circuits may claim to be applying the 
apparent authority doctrine, but the obviousness standard appears to give 
law enforcement more power than what the Supreme Court’s apparent 
authority doctrine intends: the obviousness standard allows the police to 
ignore ambiguity that would defeat an officer’s reasonable belief. 
The application of the obviousness approach in Snype and Melgar 
illustrates the consequences of the broad obviousness approach. The 
Second Circuit in Snype authorized a search under circumstances that 
                                                     
205. See Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37 (holding that the bag did not obviously belong to Snype 
because “[n]o marks on the bags linked them to him” and he failed to produce evidence 
“demonstrating that these items were obviously and exclusively his.”); Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42 
(holding that the purse did not obviously belong to another woman because there were “no exterior 
markings on the purse that should have alerted them to the fact that it belonged to another person”). 
206. See Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37 (allowing the police to search containers that lack exterior 
markings indicating obvious ownership by another person); Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42 (same).  
207. But see Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37 (endorsing the obviousness approach); Melgar, 227 F.3d 
at 1041–42 (same).  
208. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188. 
209. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968)) (alteration in original). 
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raised serious doubts about the ownership of the items seized.
210
 Upon 
realizing Snype stayed in the spare bedroom, a reasonable officer should 
have substantial doubts as to whether all of the items in the room 
belonged to Bean.
211
 Here, it seems likely that the police searched the 
knapsack and other items precisely because they thought those items 
belonged to Snype—not because officers believed the items belonged to 
Bean.
212
 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Melgar authorized the search 
of a purse found in a room used by multiple women, when only one 
woman consented to a search.
213
 To constitutionally search the purse 
under the mattress, the police must have reasonably believed it belonged 
to the consenting party.
214
 
In Snype and Melgar, ownership of the items searched was at least 
ambiguous. A cautious application of the apparent authority doctrine 
would council further inquiry into the consenting party’s authority 
before proceeding with the search.
215
 In both cases, the police should 
have been aware that the consenting party might not have actual 
authority over the items searched, but continued their searches because 
the ambiguity did not rise to the level of obvious ownership by another 
party.
216
 The obviousness approach ignores the constraints placed on 
police by the apparent authority doctrine and threatens to undermine the 
Court’s protection of individuals’ privacy in their home. 
                                                     
210. See id. 
211. See United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2014). (“The police] knew that 
Hicks and Peyton both lived in the small apartment, and they were thus on notice that some spaces 
in the apartment might be used exclusively by Peyton.”). 
212. See United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 681–82 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[N]othing in the closet 
indicated that the items within it belonged to [the defendant’s girlfriend] or were regularly used by 
her . . . .”). The court determined that a reasonable person would have doubts about the ownership 
of a shoebox found in the closet and added that “the police would likely not have opened the closed 
shoebox if they believed it belonged to [the girlfriend]. Rather, they opened the shoebox precisely 
because they believed it likely belonged to [the defendant].” Id. at 682 (quoting the district court’s 
finding of fact).  
213. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185–86 (establishing the apparent authority doctrine). 
214. Id.; cf. United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000). 
215. Contra Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42; United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136–37 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
216. See Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37; Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42. 
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B. The Ambiguity Approach Is Consistent with the Apparent Authority 
Doctrine and Superior to the Obviousness Approach Because It Is 
More Aligned with Social Norms and the Court’s Tradition of 
Protecting the Home Against Unreasonable Searches 
The Supreme Court has expressed a preference for caution and 
restraint in applying the apparent authority doctrine.
217
 In Rodriguez, the 
seminal case establishing the apparent authority doctrine, the Court 
emphasized the importance of heightened scrutiny in apparent authority 
cases.
218
 This preference for a limited application is also evident in the 
doctrine itself: police reliance on third party consent is valid under the 
apparent authority doctrine only if it is reasonable.
219
 Because the 
standard based approaches used by the circuit courts are an extension of 
the apparent authority doctrine, these approaches should, at a minimum, 
subject police conduct to the same level of scrutiny as the apparent 
authority doctrine. At present, only the ambiguity approach produces 
results consistent with the apparent authority doctrine. By limiting 
searches to containers that clearly and unambiguously fall within the 
scope of authority, the ambiguity approach is consistent the Rodriguez 
Court’s emphasis on restricting searches to areas where an officer 
reasonably believes actual authority exists.
220
 In contrast, the 
obviousness approach permits officers to search containers even where it 
is unreasonable to believe actual authority exists.
221
 
                                                     
217. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188–89 (“[W]hat we hold today does not suggest that law 
enforcement officers may always accept a person’s invitation to enter premises. Even when the 
invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion that the person lives there, the surrounding 
circumstances could conceivably be such that a reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act 
upon it without further inquiry. As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and 
seizure, determination of consent to enter must “be judged against an objective standard: would the 
facts available to the officer at the moment . . . ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’” 
that the consenting party had authority over the premises? If not, then warrantless entry without 
further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists.”) (citation omitted).  
218. See id. (explaining that police need to be cautious even when the consenting party has 
explicitly asserted authority).  
219. Id.  
220. See United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014); cf. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 
at 185–86.  
221. See supra section IV.A.  
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1. The Sixth and D.C. Circuits’ Ambiguity Approach to the Apparent 
Authority Doctrine Is Consistent with the Principles Expressed in 
Rodriguez 
The ambiguity approach is the most consistent with the apparent 
authority doctrine: if there is ambiguity regarding ownership, it is not 
reasonable for law enforcement officers to believe the consenting party 
has ownership of the item.
222
 The ambiguity approach subjects police 
conduct to the same level of constraint as the apparent authority 
doctrine.
223
 The apparent authority doctrine requires that an officer have 
a reasonable belief that the consenting party has authority over the area 
to be searched;
224
 the ambiguity approach explains that an officer cannot 
reasonably believe a party has authority if there are circumstances that 
raise uncertainty or ambiguity about ownership.
225
 Thus, the ambiguity 
approach does not alter the apparent authority doctrine, it merely uses 
different language to explain the same concept. 
The Sixth and D.C. Circuit Courts’ analysis in Taylor and Peyton 
recognize the ambiguity approach as an extension of the apparent 
authority doctrine.
226
 In Taylor, the Sixth Circuit held that the presence 
of men’s clothing in a spare bedroom made ownership over the men’s 
shoebox ambiguous.
227
 This ambiguity made it impossible for the 
officers to reasonably believe that the men’s shoebox belonged to 
Sabrina Arnett, the woman who consented to the search. In the language 
of Rodriguez, the court therefore limited the scope of the search to only 
those areas in which it was reasonable to believe Arnett had authority. 
The D.C. Circuit’s conclusion in Peyton is also consistent with the 
apparent authority doctrine as expressed in Rodriguez.
228
 As the court 
noted, “it was not reasonable for the police to believe that Hicks shared 
use of the closed shoebox” given her “clear statement that there was an 
area of the room that was not hers.”229 Even without Ms. Hicks’s 
                                                     
222. See, e.g., Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54. 
223. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185–86 (establishing the apparent authority doctrine); Peyton, 
745 F.3d 553–54 (recognizing that an officer’s reasonable belief cannot survive when facts are 
introduced making ownership of an item ambiguous).  
224. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185–86 (establishing the apparent authority doctrine).  
225. See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54. 
226. See id. (rooting its analysis in the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that the consenting 
party had actual authority); United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 681–82, 685 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(same). 
227. Taylor, 600 F.3d at 681–82. 
228. See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54; cf. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185–86.  
229. Peyton, 745 F.3d at 554.  
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statement, there was likely enough ambiguity to trigger a duty for the 
police to inquire: “They knew that Hicks and Peyton both lived in the 
small apartment, and they were thus on notice that some spaces in the 
apartment might be used exclusively by Peyton.”230 Under these 
circumstances, a reasonable person would have serious doubts as to 
whether the grandmother, Hicks, had authority over all containers next 
to the second bed.
231
 By applying the ambiguity approach, the Sixth 
Circuit in Taylor reached a conclusion that is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s expression of the apparent authority doctrine in 
Rodriguez.
232
 
Regardless of whether the court asks if ownership is ambiguous or if 
it is reasonable for officers to believe Hicks had authority, the 
conclusion will be the same, because both standards examine police 
behavior with the same level of scrutiny.
233
 If the Court determines that 
ownership of a container is ambiguous, it essentially holds that a 
reasonable officer should have doubts about Hicks’ actual authority over 
the container. Those doubts, in turn, make it unreasonable for an officer 
to rely on Hicks’ consent. Courts applying the ambiguity approach 
should always reach a conclusion consistent with the apparent authority 
doctrine because both tests are tethered to an officer’s reasonable belief 
about actual authority.
234
 
In contrast, the obviousness approach permits a far less searching 
inquiry, one that is not tethered to an officer’s reasonable belief.235 The 
obviousness approach requires only that police confine their search 
when a container obviously does not belong to the consenting party.
236
 
Case law demonstrates that to obviously belong to another party the 
container must have exterior markings linking it to another person or the 
police must see another person carrying the item.
237
 This is an extremely 
                                                     
230. See id. at 553. 
231. Id. at 554. 
232. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185–86.  
233. See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54 (applying the ambiguity approach); cf. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 
at 185–86 (applying the apparent authority doctrine). 
234. See United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 963 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[A]pparent authority 
cannot exist if there is ambiguity as to the asserted authority and the searching officers do not take 
steps to resolve the ambiguity.”). 
235. See United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying the 
obviousness approach); cf. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185–86 (applying the apparent authority 
doctrine).  
236. See Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42 (applying the obviousness approach). 
237. See United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136 (2d Cir. 2006) (“No officer ever saw Snype 
carrying the knapsack or red plastic bag. No marks on the bags linked them to him.”); Melgar, 227 
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relaxed standard—it permits officers to conduct searches in the face of 
doubts and uncertainty as long as officers do not disregard blatant 
evidence discounting authority.
238
 Consider the potential outcome of 
Peyton had it been decided under the obviousness standard: despite 
Hicks’ warning that she shared a space with Peyton, the officers’ search 
of Peyton’s belongings would have been permissible because the items 
did not obviously belong to Peyton. The items were not labeled, and the 
police did not see Peyton holding them.
239
 As this hypothetical 
illustrates, the obviousness approach permits officers to search 
containers even when doing so is inconsistent with the reasonable belief 
standard at the heart of the apparent authority doctrine. 
2. The Ambiguity Approach Is Superior to the Obviousness Approach 
Because It Conforms to Social Norms and the Court’s Tradition of 
Protecting Privacy in the Home. 
The ambiguity approach is superior to the obviousness approach 
because it provides stronger protections to individuals in their homes.
240
 
According to the Supreme Court, “[a]t the very core [of the Fourth 
Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and 
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”241 The 
language of the Fourth Amendment creates a broad range of protections 
for individuals’ “persons, houses, papers, and effects,”242 but the 
constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures is 
most strictly applied in situations where a government official searches a 
home.
243
 
                                                     
F.3d at 1041–42 (“[T]here were no exterior markings on the purse that should have alerted them to 
the fact that it belonged to another person.”). 
238. See supra section IV.A (demonstrating how the obviousness approach is not consistent with 
the apparent authority doctrine).  
239. See supra note 237 and surrounding text (examining the obviousness standard); United 
States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
240. Cf. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54 
(protecting the absent co-tenant’s right to be free from an unreasonable warrantless search). 
241. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511. 
242. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
243. See City of Seattle v. See, 67 Wash. 2d 475, 483, 408 P.2d 262 (Wash. 1965), rev’d, 387 
U.S. 541 (1967) (“The requirements of the Fourth Amendment receive their strictest application 
when a dwelling house is involved in a search.”) (quoting REX D. DAVIS, FEDERAL SEARCHES AND 
SEIZURES 8 (1964)). See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that 
warrantless use of heat-imaging technology was an unlawful search of a home); Minnesota v. 
Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (upholding the right of overnight guests to challenge the constitutionality 
of a warrantless entry into home); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (invalidating entry into 
home at night and without a warrant to arrest individual for driving while intoxicated absent more 
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As discussed in section III.A, the Court has carved out special rules 
that apply to home searches, expressly granting individuals heightened 
Fourth Amendment protections within their homes.
244
 The obviousness 
approach allows law enforcement officers to rely on the consent of a 
third party to search containers in a common area, even where police do 
not have a reasonable belief that the third party has the proper 
authority.
245
 Thus, the obviousness approach runs counter to the 
Supreme Court’s goals of protecting privacy rights in the home. In 
contrast, the ambiguity approach, which requires officers to inquire 
before searching a container if there is any degree of ambiguity over the 
ownership of items, is more consistent with Supreme Court precedent 
expressing heightened Fourth Amendment protections in the home.
246
 
In addition to tracking Supreme Court precedent, the ambiguity 
approach is superior to the obviousness approach because it is more 
closely aligned with modern privacy expectations. In the context of 
shared living spaces, modern social expectations require that law 
enforcement officers ask questions before searching any container in a 
common area, because police should not assume that open-ended 
consent extends to all containers.
247
 As the D.C. Circuit explained in 
Donovan v. A.A. Beiro Construction Co.,
248
 “[w]hile authority to consent 
to search of a common area extends to most objects in plain view, it does 
not automatically extend to the interiors of every enclosed space within 
the area.”249 
Imagine a college student, Greg, living in a four-bedroom apartment 
with a group of friends. One day, Greg leaves his backpack on the couch 
in the living room, expecting that his roommates will not go through the 
backpack while he is gone. After all, it is a common understanding 
among the roommates that nobody has permission to look inside the 
backpack of an absent roommate—even if the roommates are all in the 
common area together.
250
 While Greg is gone, the police knock on the 
                                                     
significant exigent circumstances); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (refusing to extend 
search incident to a lawful arrest to include warrantless search of defendant’s entire house). 
244. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414–18 (2013); Kyllo, 
533 U.S. at 35–40. 
245. See United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2006). 
246. Cf. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415–18. 
247. Cf. United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 552–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
248. 746 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
249. Id. at 901–02; see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 725 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“A homeowner’s consent to a search of the 
home may not be effective consent to a search of a closed object inside the home.”). 
250. Cf. Donovan, 746 F.2d at 901–02. 
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door and ask one of Greg’s roommates if they can search the apartment. 
Greg’s roommate does not have permission to go through Greg’s 
backpack, so it follows naturally that he cannot consent to a search of 
Greg’s backpack.251 However, under the obviousness approach, the 
police will assume that he has authority over the backpack as long as it 
does not have exterior markings linking it to Greg.
252
 
The obviousness approach allows police officers to exploit a 
judicially created loophole in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and 
behave in ways that offend widely shared beliefs about privacy and 
housemate relationships. Although the ambiguity approach is more 
closely aligned with modern social expectations and Supreme Court 
precedent than the obviousness approach, it still leaves open the 
possibility that the police will search an absent tenant’s container 
without his consent. Thus, the Court should adopt a bright-line rule 
requiring police to ensure that actual authority exists before searching 
containers in the home. 
V. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT A BRIGHT-LINE 
RULE REQUIRING LAW ENFORCEMENT TO INQUIRE 
BEFORE SEARCHING ANY CONTAINER IN A  
COMMON AREA 
The standard-based approaches developed by the circuit courts should 
be overruled in favor of a bright-line rule requiring the police to ask 
questions before searching any container in a shared living space.
253
 
Trends in cohabitation and modern social expectations warrant revisiting 
the apparent authority doctrine.
254
 There has been a sharp increase in the 
percentage of unmarried, non-partner roommates sharing a home,
255
 and, 
at the same time, there are more adults living with their parents than in 
                                                     
251. Cf. Peyton, 745 F.3d at 552 (“The fact that a person has common authority over a house, an 
apartment, or a particular room, does not mean that she can authorize a search of anything and 
everything within that area.”). 
252. Cf. United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Melgar, 
227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000). 
253. Cf. Weiber, supra note 97 (advocating for a test that “would ask whether a person actually 
has express or implied common authority over the premises and is thus able to consent to a search 
of the premises”). Weiber calls this test the “common authority in fact” test. Id. He contends that 
“[t]he test would prevent a defendant’s right to security in his home or property from being violated 
without some notice, and would protect a third party’s interest in shared property from being 
imposed upon by a criminal co-inhabitant” and that it “would not significantly reduce law 
enforcement effectiveness.” Id. at 641. 
254. See Fry, Living With Parents, supra note 112. 
255. Salama, supra note 7.  
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any time in recent history.
256
 It is now common for Americans to live 
with one or more roommates, with the percentage of adults living with 
roommates increasing from just over 25% in 2000 to 32% in 2012.
257
 In 
light of this significant increase in the percentage of adults living with 
roommates, the Supreme Court should introduce a bright-line rule 
requiring law enforcement to inquire about actual authority before 
searching any container in a common area.
258
 “[T]his test avoids the 
hazards of the reasonableness test by allowing only a party who has 
actual or implied shared authority over the premises to consent to a 
search.”259 It would also improve judicial economy, lower the burden on 
law enforcement to make legal determinations on the spot, and eliminate 
the incentive for law enforcement to ask fewer questions.
260
 
A. The Recommended Bright-Line Approach Would Allow the 
Supreme Court to Protect Privacy Rights Better than the Ambiguity 
Approach and Bring the Law into Conformity with Social Norms 
The ambiguity approach is the most consistent with the Court’s 
articulation of the apparent authority doctrine in Rodriguez, but it still 
opens the door for a co-tenant to inadvertently consent to a search of 
items that do not belong to her. The practical effect of the standard-
based approaches, like the ambiguity and obviousness approaches, is the 
creation of a strong incentive for police to ask for consent only once, 
                                                     
256. See Fry, Living With Parents, supra note 112. 
257. Salama, supra note 7. 
258. Cf. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At the very core [of the Fourth 
Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.”); United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1169 n.4 (9th Cir. 
2003) (“By staying in a shared house, one does not assume the risk that a housemate will snoop 
under one’s bed, much less permit others to do so.”).  
259. Weiber, supra note 97, at 636. 
260. See id. at 620. (“The Supreme Court’s rule tends to discourage government agents from 
conducting an extensive investigation of the facts before entering property.”); George E. Dix, 
Promises, Confessions, and Wayne LaFave’s Bright Line Rule Analysis, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 207, 
229 (1993) (“[T]he bright line nature of the rule permits easier judicial application.”); Wayne R. 
LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright Lines” and “Good 
Faith,” 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 320–33 (1982) (addressing the many advantages to bright-line 
rules). In the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has sometimes preferred bright-line rules to 
provide clear boundaries for individuals to know the scope of their rights and for law enforcement 
officers to know the scope of their authority. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 
(1973) (creating a bright-line rule that officers may search an arrestee incident to every lawful arrest 
without considering the likelihood of finding evidence or a weapon); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 
U.S. 42, 50–52 (1970) (creating a bright-line rule that police may search an automobile without a 
warrant as long as there is probable cause). 
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because open-ended consent grants an incredibly broad scope.
261
 This 
makes it simpler for the officers to do their job but incentivizes officers 
to ask fewer questions and rely on incomplete information.
262
 
Under the ambiguity approach, law enforcement can obtain open-
ended consent from someone who appears to live at an apartment and 
then search any items over which ownership is not ambiguous.
263
 But 
just because ownership over an item is not ambiguous does not mean 
that it definitely belongs to the consenting party—many roommates 
could have similar taste in clothes or similar types of backpacks that 
would not alert an officer to ownership by another party. The ambiguity 
approach protects absent tenants from unreasonable searches when the 
item raises uncertainty in the officer’s mind, but it does not protect 
absent tenants from unreasonable government searches when the item is 
plain and does not raise suspicion as to ownership. 
The proposed bright-line approach would protect privacy in the home 
but would go beyond the ambiguity approach used in Peyton, Taylor, 
and Purcell by requiring law enforcement officers to inquire before 
searching any container in a common area inside a home. Under this 
rule, absent co-tenants are protected from unreasonable searches 
regardless of whether a police officer believes that an item could 
reasonably belong to the consenting co-tenant. It requires the police to 
ensure that the consenting co-tenant has actual authority before 
searching closed containers. This bright-line approach reflects modern 
attitudes about cohabitation because it acknowledges that co-tenants do 
not have joint authority over every container in the residence.
264
 
B. A Bright-Line Rule Offers Valuable Benefits to Law Enforcement, 
Lawyers, and Judges 
Modern constitutional criminal procedure prefers bright-line 
categorical rules that are “easily administrable” by officers in the 
                                                     
261. Cf. United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Melgar, 
227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000). 
262. See Snype, 441 F.3d at 126–27 (where officers searched the knapsack found in the bedroom 
where Snype was arrested, but avoided asking any questions that would reveal the fact that the 
knapsack belonged to Snype and not the woman who consented to the search); Melgar, 227 F.3d at 
1039–40 (where officers, in a room with multiple women, searched a purse without asking any 
questions that would reveal the true owner of the purse).  
263. Cf. Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37; Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041–42. 
264. Donovan v. A.A. Beiro Construction Co., 746 F.2d 894, 901–02 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“While 
authority to consent to search of a common area extends to most objects in plain view, it does not 
automatically extend to the interiors of every enclosed space within the area.”).  
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field.
265
 The term “bright-line” has been used primarily in Fourth 
Amendment discourse to describe “‘standardized procedures’ . . . which 
may ‘be applied to all cases of a certain type, regardless of particular 
factual variations.’”266 “The advocates of bright-line rules essentially 
believe that the rules provide easy to follow guidelines for law 
enforcement, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges alike.”267 Bright-
line rules have several alluring features: “they are more easily 
administrable by officers” because they offer “simplified administration, 
predictability, and the diminution of the need for on-the-spot judgment 
calls that may be colored by subjective differences between officers.”268 
Professor Wayne R. LaFave “has been the most outspoken advocate for 
the adoption of bright-line rules in criminal procedure,” 269 describing the 
advantage of a bright-line rule in terms of probability that an officer 
applying the rule will reach the correct conclusion: 
And thus, as between a complicated rule which in a theoretical 
sense produces the desired result 100% of the time, but which 
well-intentioned police could be expected to apply correctly in 
only 75% of the cases, and a readily understood and easily 
applied rule which would bring about the theoretically correct 
conclusion 90% of the time, the latter is to be preferred over the 
former.
270
 
Furthermore, bright-line rules allow “easier judicial application,” 
reducing “the time and effort spent by judges, lawyers, and litigants 
administering the legal requirement and maximiz[ing] consistent and 
thus ‘fair’ application of the rule.”271 
In several Fourth Amendment cases, the Court has utilized bright-line 
rules.
272
 The most prominent of such cases is the landmark decision 
                                                     
265. Mary D. Fan, The Police Gamesmanship Dilemma in Criminal Procedure, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1407, 1464–65 (2011). 
266. LaFave, supra note 260, at 322–23. 
267. Andrew McLetchie, The Case for Bright-Line Rules in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence: 
Adopting the Tenth Circuit’s Bright-Line Test for Determining the Voluntariness of Consent, 30 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 225, 228 (2001). See also Daniel T. Gillespie, Bright-Line Rules: Development of 
the Law of Search and Seizure During Traffic Stops, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3 (1999) (noting that 
bright-line rules facilitate the application of the law).  
268. Fan, supra note 265, at 1465. 
269. McLetchie, supra note 260, at 227. 
270. LaFave, supra note 260, at 321. 
271. Dix, supra note 260, at 229. 
272. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453–55 (1971) (explaining that the basic 
constitutional rule is that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by 
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment”); Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961). 
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Mapp v. Ohio
273
 extending the federal exclusionary rule to state court 
proceedings.
274
 In Mapp, a woman was charged for possessing obscene 
materials, but the Court suppressed the evidence because the police 
lacked probable cause to search for such materials in her apartment.
275
 
The exclusionary rule developed in Mapp provides that any evidence 
obtained in contravention of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible as 
substantive evidence against a criminal defendant.
276
 Another example 
of a bright-line Supreme Court holding is found in Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire,
277
 where the Court held that the warrantless search and 
seizure of an unoccupied car was a per se violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.
278
 
Perhaps the most famous example of a judicially mandated bright-line 
rule in criminal procedure comes from Miranda v. Arizona.
279
 In 
Miranda, the Supreme Court held that statements made by the suspect 
during custodial interrogation are admissible at trial only if 
the prosecution can show that the defendant was informed of the right to 
consult with an attorney, the right against self-incrimination, and that the 
defendant not only understood these rights, but voluntarily waived 
them.
280
 These rights came to be known as the Miranda rights and 
became part of routine police procedure to ensure that suspects were 
informed of their constitutional rights.
281
 Miranda fits within and yet 
stands out as a particularly strong example of bright-line rules within 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
                                                     
273. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
274. See id. at 657.  
275. See id. at 654–55. 
276. Id.  
277. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
278. See id. at 453–55. 
279. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
280. See id. at 478–79. 
281. See DANIEL T. GILLESPIE, MICH. CRIM. L. & PROC. § 18:121 (2d ed. 2017) (describing the 
rights as the “Miranda rights” and explaining their significance).  
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C.  The Minimal Burden of Asking Clarifying Questions Should Be 
Borne by Law Enforcement Officers Because They Are Well-
Trained and Well-Situated to Protect the Rights of Absent Parties 
The burden of asking clarifying questions should be placed on the 
party best situated to bear this responsibility—the government.282 As the 
Rodriguez Court put it, “[t]he burden of establishing . . . common 
authority [over property] rests upon the State.”283 While there are 
potential objections to this approach, the objections do not outweigh the 
numerous advantages outlined in this Comment.
284
 Training police to 
ask questions in every situation increases the chance that all evidence 
seized will be admissible in court.
285
 Also, the burden of asking these 
questions is quite small and does not outweigh the value of protecting 
criminal defendants’ rights.286 In fact, the questions that officers would 
be asking under a bright-line approach would be similar to the warnings 
that police are required to provide under Miranda in the context of 
custodial interrogations.
287
 
One potential objection to this approach is that it would be laborious 
for law enforcement to implement because officers would be burdened 
with the duty to inquire about potentially hundreds of containers in a 
home.
288
 This rule only requires that officers, when confronted with a 
closed container, ask if it belongs to the person who consented to the 
                                                     
282. See DOJ PRINCIPLES OF GOOD POLICING, supra note 139, at 6 (“[T]he police, by virtue of the 
authority that society vests in them, have overarching responsibility for the outcome of encounters 
with citizens.”). 
283. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990).  
284. See supra Part IV.  
285. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961). Asking clarifying questions would help 
reduce the amount of evidence excluded under the exclusionary rule because officers would be less 
likely to seize evidence that is “off-limits” if they had more information about the evidence they 
were seizing.  
286. See Weiber, supra note 97, at 638 (“Even though the test would slow down law enforcement 
activities, this is a relatively small price to pay for the added protection to criminal defendants’ 
rights which the test provides.”); id. at 605 (“This test would require that a person who consents to 
the search actually have common authority over the place or item searched. . . . Additionally, such a 
test would not significantly impede law enforcement efforts.”); cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 478–79 (1966). The burden of asking clarifying questions is seemingly lower than the burden 
of reading a person her Miranda rights; Miranda rights consist of a paragraph of information 
whereas asking a question can be done in a single short sentence, such as “Is this your backpack?” 
287. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79. 
288. See Frank J. Stretz, An Objective Solution to an Ambiguous Problem: Determining the 
Ownership of Closed Containers During a Consensual Search, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 203, 220–21 
(2011).  
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search. Complying with this rule would be as simple as asking, “is this 
your shoebox?” or “do you use these drawers?”289 
The burden to clarify the scope of the search should be on the 
government, rather than the consenting party, because the burden of 
establishing the existence of apparent authority rests on the 
government.
290
 After all, the government is trying to circumvent the 
warrant requirement by asking for consent to conduct a search.
291
 Thus, 
it follows that the police should also bear the burden of clarifying the 
scope of an individual’s open-ended consent when the police seek to 
search a closed container.
292
 
Putting the burden on individuals to clarify the scope of their consent 
is unreasonable because unlike the police, individuals do not have 
training on Fourth Amendment consent searches,
293
 and individuals do 
not have an incentive to provide detailed clarifications without 
prompting.
294
 If consenting parties do not limit the scope of their 
                                                     
289. Cf. United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 958 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Agent Rolfsen moved 
toward the duffel bags by the door and pointed to ‘a green brown bag’ and asked Crist ‘[i]s it this 
bag?’”) (alteration in original). 
290. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (“As we stated in Matlock . . . , ‘[c]ommon 
authority’ rests ‘on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control 
for most purposes. . . .’ The burden of establishing that common authority rests upon the State.”) 
(second and third alterations in original). 
291. See id. at 190 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Because the sole law enforcement purpose 
underlying third-party consent searches is avoiding the inconvenience of securing a warrant, a 
departure from the warrant requirement is not justified simply because an officer reasonably 
believes a third party has consented to a search of the defendant’s home.”).  
292. Cf. Marc L. Edmondson, Scope of Consent Searches: Are Police Officers and Judges 
Misguided by the Objective Reasonableness Test?, 57 MO. L. REV. 1057, 1072 (1992) (“Perhaps a 
more palatable and workable rule would be to break the types of consent searches into three 
categories: (1) a general consent search, (2) a consent search with an expressed object, and (3) a 
consent search with an expressed object that focuses on containers. Under this approach, the 
specificity of the request determines the permissible scope of the search.”). 
293. For instance, Seattle police officers are trained on the rules surrounding consent searches. 
See SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL § 6.180 (updated Mar. 1, 
2017), https://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-6—-arrests-search-and-seizure/6180—-searches-
general [https://perma.cc/2VPC-G98M] (“Consent is valid if the third person has equal authority 
over the business or residence and it can be concluded the absent person assumed the risk the 
cohabitant (roommate) might permit a search.”). See also Weiber, supra note 97, at 620 (“Because 
of their training and jobs, the police will naturally have a superior ability to ask questions which, 
when read to the jury, will make it appear as if the police were reasonable in believing that the 
consenting party had authority to allow the search. Additionally, the police will know which 
questions not to ask—especially those which may reveal that a party does not have the requisite 
authority to allow a search.”).  
294. Cf. United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (where the defendant’s 
grandmother told police that the defendant kept his belongings in the living room, but did not clarify 
which objects actually belonged to the defendant); United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 679–80 
(6th Cir. 2010) (where the tenant consented to a search but did not tell police that she lacked 
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consent, then they are potentially eroding the privacy rights of their 
roommates.
295
 The courts should not create a system that places the 
burden of clarifying the scope of authority on a party that has no 
incentive to properly limit consent and a high potential to erode the 
rights of others.
296
 Instead, the courts should require the government to 
clarify the scope of the consenting party’s authority because the 
government is better positioned than individuals to understand Fourth 
Amendment implications.
297
 
Another potential objection to this approach is that it would make it 
harder for law enforcement officers to collect evidence.
298
 Switching 
from a standard-based approach to this bright-line rule would narrow the 
scope of potentially collectible evidence.
299
 This is particularly true in 
jurisdictions using the obviousness approach because law enforcement 
will no longer be afforded the wide latitude of the illogical obviousness 
standard—officers will only be able to collect evidence that falls within 
the consenting party’s actual authority.300 However, this will not unfairly 
constrain police officers during investigations because officers should 
not knowingly obtain evidence outside the scope of the consenting 
party’s authority in the first place. 
                                                     
authority over her male guest’s belongings in the spare bedroom); United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 
119, 127 (2d Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(where one person consented to a search but did not clarify for the police the exact items over which 
he or she did not have authority). 
295. Cf. Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37. 
296. See Weiber, supra note 97, at 626–27 (“[A] defendant cannot know that a stranger or party 
in whom no common authority rests may consent to a search . . . . [A] criminal defendant has no 
ability to shield his privacy interests because he cannot know when someone who lacks sufficient 
authority over his property will permit a search. The relationship between a third party who lacks 
authority and the defendant is, by definition, too attenuated for the defendant to recognize the risk of 
a search.”); Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54 (where the court protected the rights of the absent co-tenant 
and put the burden of clarifying the scope of consent onto the police).  
297. See Peyton, 745 F.3d at 553–54; United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 
1991) (“[T]he government’s burden to establish that a third party had authority to consent to a 
search . . . cannot be met if agents, faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed without 
making further inquiry. If the agents do not learn enough, if the circumstances make it unclear 
whether the property about to be searched is subject to ‘mutual use’ by the person giving consent, 
‘then warrantless entry is unlawful without further inquiry.’” (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 
U.S. 177, 188–89 (1990)) (emphasis added in Whitfield). 
298. See Stretz, supra note 288, at 204 (“Such a rule would essentially freeze the legitimate 
exercise of police authority, spark an inestimable amount of litigation over hairsplitting ambiguities, 
and make officers unduly fearful of the unintended legal consequences lurking under every lid.”). 
299. Cf. Snype, 441 F.3d at 136–37 (where officers were permitted to search anything not 
obviously belonging to another party, which encompassed everything in the apartment). 
300. Contra id. 
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Although this bright-line rule might result in “lost” evidence, the 
Fourth Amendment itself has imposed the cost.
301
 This situation is 
closely analogous to Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s comments 
in his law review article concerning the exclusionary rule.
302
 As Justice 
Stewart explained, the exclusionary rule maintains the status quo that 
would have prevailed if the Fourth Amendment requirements had been 
obeyed: 
Much of the criticism leveled at the exclusionary rule is 
misdirected; it is more properly directed at the fourth 
amendment itself. It is true that, as many observers have 
charged, the effect of the [exclusionary] rule is to deprive the 
courts of extremely relevant, often direct evidence of the guilt of 
the defendant. But these same critics fail to acknowledge that, in 
many instances, the same extremely relevant evidence would not 
have been obtained had the police officer complied with the 
commands of the fourth amendment in the first place.
303
 
Because the proposed bright-line rule only requires law enforcement 
officers to clarify the scope of consent, the cost of “lost” evidence is 
properly credited to the Fourth Amendment itself, rather than the bright-
line rule.
304
 
If exigent circumstances exist, such as an imminent risk that the 
evidence would be destroyed, then the government will have an 
exception to the warrant requirement and will be able to search the 
container immediately.
305
 Thus, the only situation in which this proposed 
rule would prevent law enforcement officers from getting evidence they 
need would be when there are no exigent circumstances and the officers 
                                                     
301. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 941 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
[Fourth] Amendment directly contemplates that some reliable and incriminating evidence will be 
lost to the government; therefore, it is not the exclusionary rule, but the Amendment itself that has 
imposed this cost.”). 
302. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development, and 
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1392–93 
(1983) (“The exclusionary rule places no limitations on the actions of the police. The fourth 
amendment does. The inevitable result of the Constitution’s prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures and its requirement that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause is that 
police officers who obey its strictures will catch fewer criminals. . . . [That] is the price the framers 
anticipated and were willing to pay to ensure the sanctity of the person, the home, and property 
against unrestrained governmental power.”). 
303. Id. at 1392.  
304. See id.  
305. The need “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence” has long been recognized as a 
sufficient justification for a warrantless search. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 
(2006); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 116 n.6 (2006); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 
(1990).  
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do not have a warrant. A container that law enforcement officers could 
not search under this rule should not be viewed as “lost” evidence 
because preventing the government from seizing evidence without a 
warrant is the essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment.
306
 
Critics of the ambiguity approach might argue that law enforcement 
officers should not be required to ask clarifying questions in this context 
because they are not required to do so in other contexts. For example, 
the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
307
 and United States v. 
Drayton
308
 made clear that it will rarely place a duty on law enforcement 
officers to inform an individual of his right to object to a search.
309
 
Placing a duty on law enforcement officers to clarify the ownership of 
containers is different than making officers inform a suspect of her right 
to object to a search.
310
 Bustmaonte and Drayton assert that law 
enforcement officers have no duty to educate the public about the right 
to object to a search.
311
 But placing a duty on law enforcement officers 
to inquire before searching a closed container does not require officers to 
                                                     
306. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 941 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“If nothing else, the [Fourth] 
Amendment plainly operates to disable the government from gathering information and securing 
evidence in certain ways. In practical terms, of course, this restriction of official power means that 
some incriminating evidence inevitably will go undetected if the government obeys these 
constitutional restraints. It is the loss of that evidence that is the ‘price’ our society pays for 
enjoying the freedom and privacy safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment.”). 
307. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
308. 536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
309. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227 (“While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor 
to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of 
an effective consent.”) (italics in original); Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206 (“The Court has rejected in 
specific terms the suggestion that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to refuse 
when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search.”). In Bustamonte, the police 
pulled over a vehicle containing six individuals for a broken headlight and license plate light. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 220. The driver was unable to produce a driver’s license, but one of the 
passengers was able to produce one. Id. The passenger consented to a search of the vehicle, and 
three stolen checks were recovered as a result. Id. Bustamonte argued that the consent was invalid. 
Id. at 220–21. The Court held that the police do not have a duty to inform individuals of their right 
to object to a search—the government needs to show only that voluntary consent existed. See id. at 
246–49. In Drayton, police officers boarded a Greyhound bus as part of a drug interdiction effort 
and interviewed passengers. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197–98. Officers found bags of cocaine on two of 
the passengers who consented to a search. Id. at 198–99. The passengers argued that the search was 
unlawful because the police engaged in coercive behavior by boarding the bus and not informing the 
passengers that they could object to a search. Id. at 199–200. The Supreme Court held that the 
search was valid because there was no coercion on the part of the police—the passengers were free 
to object to the search or exit the bus. See id. at 200, 206–07. The Court affirmed the holding in 
Bustamonte that the police have no duty to inform individuals of their right to object to a search. Id. 
at 207. 
310. Cf. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 246–49. 
311. See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206–07; Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 246–49. 
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educate the public about Fourth Amendment rights
312—it merely 
requires officers to ascertain whether the consenting party actually has 
the authority to grant consent in the first place. 
In sum, the Supreme Court should adopt a bright-line rule governing 
third party consent searches of containers because it would maximize 
protection for individuals in their homes, and bring the law into 
conformity with social expectations. Such a rule is beneficial to law 
enforcement, lawyers, and judges, while placing only a minimal burden 
on officers. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Amendment was intended to protect individuals from 
unreasonable governmental intrusions into their private lives. Circuit 
courts disagree as to whether law enforcement has a duty to inquire 
about the extent of a consenting party’s actual authority over containers 
in a common area.
313
 This is particularly problematic in today’s society 
because millions of Americans take advantage of shared living 
arrangements.
314
 Of the currently established approaches, the approach 
taken by the D.C. Circuit in Peyton is superior because it provides more 
protection to individuals than the obviousness approach at almost no 
additional cost to police.
315
 However, to properly safeguard individuals’ 
Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court should declare an even 
more protective bright-line rule requiring officers to inquire before 
searching any container in a common area.
316
 A bright-line approach 
goes even further than the ambiguity approach in maximizing Fourth 
Amendment protections; it replaces an amorphous standard with a clear 
rule that is simple for law enforcement, judges, and lawyers to apply. 
 
                                                     
312. Cf. United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (requiring the police to 
determine the scope of open-ended consent when there is ambiguity as to ownership of the 
container); United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 685 (6th Cir. 2010) (same).  
313. See supra Part IV.  
314. See supra Part I.  
315. See supra Part IV.  
316. See supra Part V.  
